Abstract-We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) in which firms follow one of four price-setting regimes: sticky prices, sticky information, rule of thumb, or full-information flexible prices. The parameters of the model, including the fraction of each type of firm, are estimated by matching the moments of the observed variables of the model to those found in the data. We find that sticky price firms and sticky information firms jointly account for over 80% of firms in the model. We compare the performance of our hybrid model to pure sticky price and sticky information models along various dimensions, including monetary policy implications.
I. Introduction
T HE nature of firms', price-setting decisions has long played a pivotal role underlying controversies in macroeconomics. Whereas real business cycle models assume that firms with full information are free to set prices optimally at all times, New Keynesian models are typically defined by departures from the assumption of flexible prices. Recent work has also emphasized the implications of deviating from the assumption of full information in price setting. 1 This paper is motivated by the idea that a single assumption about firms' price-setting decision processes may be insufficient to adequately capture macroeconomic dynamics by missing potentially important interactions among heterogeneous firms. Indeed, firm-level evidence indicates striking heterogeneity in price setting, as well as significant information costs. 2 We develop and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that allows four commonly assumed price-setting sectors to coexist and interact via their price-setting decisions. Our results indicate that (a) the hybrid model fits the data substantially better than any of the models consisting solely of one type of firm, (b) stickyprice and sticky information firms account for more than 80% of all firms in the hybrid model, (c) neither rule-ofthumb nor flexible-price full information firms are important to match the moments of the data, and (d) strategic interaction among different price setting practices is qualitatively and quantitatively important.
To assess the relative importance of heterogeneity in firms' price-setting behavior, we consider a continuum of monopolistic producers of intermediate goods, divided into four segments, each of which uses a different price-setting approach: sticky prices, sticky information, rule of thumb, and full information flexible price firms.
3 This setup is nested in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with a representative consumer and a central bank. The parameters of the model, including the share of each type of firm, are estimated jointly using a method-of-moments approach. This delivers a set of predicted moments for the observable variables that can be directly compared to those of the data.
Because we allow these four types of firms to coexist, our model nests many price-setting models considered in the literature. For example, sticky price models are frequently augmented with rule-of-thumb firms to better match the inflation inertia observed in the data, but the relative importance of forward-looking versus backward-looking behavior has been much debated. 4 Our result that sticky price firms account for approximately 60% of firms is consistent with the findings of much of this literature, but we argue that sticky price firms should be modeled along with sticky information firms rather than rule-of-thumb firms to generate inflation inertia.
Flexible price full-information firms are included to capture the potential importance of heterogeneity in rates at which prices and information are updated. Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009), Carvalho (2006) , and Aoki (2001) demonstrate that heterogeneity in price stickiness across sectors affects the dynamics and optimal monetary policy of a sticky price model, respectively. By including flexible price firms, our model nests a simple case of such heterogeneity. The fact that these types of firms receive an estimated share of only 8% indicates that heterogeneity of this sort is relatively unimportant to match the moments of the data.
The presence of sticky price, sticky information, and ruleof-thumb firms also nests empirical work to assess the factual support for the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) versus the sticky information Phillips curve (SIPC). While results have been either ambiguous or favored the NKPC (Korenok, 2008; Kiley, 2007; Coibion, 2010) , most of this literature has assumed that either the NKPC or SIPC (or their weighted average) forms the true models without allowing coexistence of different price-setting mechanisms. We build on this approach by allowing for both sticky price and sticky information firms to coexist and interact via strategic complementarities in price setting. Our finding that both types of firms are required to best match the data thus calls into question much of this previous work focused on only one model or the other.
By considering a hybrid model with sticky prices and sticky information, this paper is most closely related to recent work by Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2010) , Knotek (2009) , and Klenow and Willis (2007) , each of which superimposes delayed information updating as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) upon firms already facing nominal rigidities: menu costs in Knotek (2009) and Klenow and Willis (2007) and time-dependent updating in Dupor et al. (2010) . Each finds empirical evidence for sticky prices and sticky information. Thus, our results complement their findings. However, our approach differs from theirs in three important aspects. First, whereas each of these papers considers models in which all firms are subject to both sticky prices and sticky information, our model allows sticky price and sticky information firms to coexist and interact via strategic complementarities in price setting, but does not allow any firm to have both sticky prices and sticky information. While we view our approach as a better approximation to the fact that the relative importance of pricing and informational rigidities varies across firms, and thus are likely to be best modeled with different pricing assumptions, whether sticky prices and sticky information are best integrated vertically (as in Klenow & Willis, 2007 , Knotek, 2009 , and Dupor et al., 2010 or horizontally is an as-of-yet unexplored empirical question. Second, our model is more general since it nests sticky price, sticky information, and ruleof-thumb firms, as well as flexible price full information firms, whereas Klenow and Willis (2007) , Knotek (2009) , and Dupor et al. (2010) exclude either rule-of-thumb or flexible price full information or both types of firms. Third, neither Knotek (2009) nor Dupor et al. (2010) use fully specified DSGE models for their empirical results and thus are not able to explore the implications of heterogeneous price setting for the sources of business cycles and optimal monetary policy.
To estimate our DSGE model, we use the dynamic autoand cross-covariances of observable variables. These moments provide important insights about the lead-lag structure of economic relationships. By comparing the ability of the estimated hybrid model and estimated pure models to match these moments of the data, one contribution of the paper is being able to assess why the data prefer our hybrid model over pure sticky price or sticky information models. For example, the moments of the data indicate that inflation leads output growth and interest rates. This stylized fact is the primary reason that sticky price firms account for such a large fraction of firms, since sticky prices induce more forward-looking behavior than alternative price-setting setups do.
We also consider the implications of our results for optimal monetary policy. While much work has been devoted to studying optimal monetary policy for sticky price models, and some work has extended this type of analysis to sticky information, Kitamura (2008) is the only other paper that considers optimal monetary policy in a hybrid sticky price and sticky information model and does so using the vertically integrated hybrid model of Dupor et al. (2010) .
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Based on our estimated DSGE model, we find that there could be gains in welfare if the central bank used policy rules different from the estimated Taylor rule. In particular, our simulations indicate improvements when the central banker has a more aggressive response to inflation or incorporates an element of price-level targeting in his or her reaction function. We show that using pure sticky price or sticky information models can mislead the central banker about potential gains from using alternative policy rules in the presence of heterogeneous price setting. The fact that Kitamura (2008) reaches a similar conclusion using an alternative integration of price and informational rigidities supports the notion that accounting for both types of rigidities has important monetary policy implications that are not adequately addressed in either pure sticky price or pure sticky information models. Finally, we find that there is little penalty from using a policy with a response to inflation that is uniform across sectors relative to policy rules with differential responses.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II, we present the model. Section III discusses the empirical methodology. Our benchmark estimates, discussion, and robustness analysis are in section IV. Section V considers the implications of our results for optimal monetary policy, and section VI concludes.
II. Model
The model has three principal types of agents: consumers, firms, and the central bank. The consumer's problem is modeled as a representative agent with internal habit formation. Production is broken into final goods and intermediate goods. Production of the final goods is perfectly competitive, whereas the intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistic producers that follow different price-setting rules. Finally, the central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor (1993) rule.
A. Consumer's Problem
The representative agent seeks to maximize the present discounted value of current and future utility levels, max fC tþk ;N tþk ðiÞ;H tþk g 1 k¼0
where C t is consumption at time t, N t (i) is labor supplied to intermediate goods firm i, h is the degree of internal habit formation, g is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, b is the discount factor, and g t is a shock to the marginal utility of consumption. We allow labor to be supplied individually to specific firms to generate strategic complementarity in price setting. Consumption enters in a logarithmic form to be consistent with a balanced-growth path. Each period, the consumer faces the following budget constraint,
where H t is the stock of risk-free bonds held at time t, R t is the gross nominal interest rate earned on bonds in the subsequent period, W t (i) is the nominal wage earned from labor supplied to intermediate goods firm i, and T t consists of profits returned to the consumer. Finally, P t is the price of the consumption good at time t. Defining L t to be the shadow value of wealth, the firstorder conditions with respect to each control variable are
Labor Supply N 1=g t
The final good is produced by a perfectly competitive industry using a continuum of 
Despite the presence of firm-specific labor supply, we assume that firms treat wages as exogenously determined. The optimal frictionless price (P # t ) is a markup l : y/(y À 1) over firm-specific nominal marginal costs, where the latter are given by MC t ( j) ¼ W t ( j)/A t . Eliminating the firm-specific elements of marginal cost by substituting in the labor supply condition and the firm-level demand yields the following relationship between real firm-specific marginal costs and aggregate marginal costs,
where
, and D t R 1 0 ðP t ðiÞ=P t Þ Àxh di is a measure of the dispersion of prices across firms. We can then write a firm's instantaneous optimal desired relative price as
Since there is no capital, government spending, or international trade in the model, the goods market-clearing condition is simply Y t ¼ C t .
C. Price-Setting Behavior
Intermediate-good-producing firms are assumed to be in one of four price-setting sectors: sticky prices, sticky information, rule of thumb, or flexible prices. Without loss of generality, firms of the same pricing sector are grouped into segments so that the price level can be written as ; where sp, si, rot, and flex are indices for sticky price, sticky information, rule-of-thumb, and flexible price firms, respectively. Importantly, firms are otherwise identical in the sense that a firm in a given sector is the same competitor to all other firms symmetrically regardless of whether they are in the same sector. The weighting parameters s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 are the fractions of firms that belong to the sticky price, sticky information, and rule-of-thumb sectors, respectively. where L t,tþk is the nominal stochastic discount factor between times t and t þ k and firm-specific marginal costs and output are as before. Taking the first-order condition and replacing firm-specific marginal costs and output with their corresponding aggregate terms yields the optimality condition,
so that all firms with the opportunity to reset prices choose the same value of B t . The price level for sticky price firms obeys
Sticky information firms. These firms face a Poisson process for updating their information sets, with the probability of getting new information in each period given by 1Àd si . In every period, firms set prices freely given their information set. The profit-maximization problem at time t for firm j, which last updated its information set at time t À k, is then P si tjtÀk ð jÞ ¼ arg max P E tÀk ½ðP À MC t ð jÞÞY t ð jÞ;
where firm-specific marginal costs and demand are determined as before. This yields the first-order condition that
which implies that all sticky information firms with the same information set will choose the same price. The price level for sticky information firms is
To have a finite state space of the model, we will truncate the sum in equation (9) to only p lags, where p is chosen sufficiently large to not affect our results.
Rule-of-thumb firms. These firms always change their prices by the previous period's inflation rate. 6 Hence, the price level for the rule-of-thumb sector follows
Flexible price/information firms. These firms are always free to change prices and have complete information. They thus always set prices equal to the instantaneously optimal price. The price level for flexible price firms is then just P flex t ¼ P # t .
D. Shocks
We assume the following shock processes. First, technology shocks follow a random walk with drift
where e a,t are independently distributed with mean zero and variance r 2 a . Preference shocks follow a stationary AR(1) process,
where e g,t are independently distributed shocks with mean zero and variance r 2 g .
E. Log-Linearizing around the Balanced-Growth Path
To ensure stationarity, we log-linearize the model around the balanced-growth path in which Y t /A t is stationary. Note that equation (1) ensures that L t A t is also stationary. Defining y t and k t to be the log deviations of Y t /A t and L t A t from their balanced-growth paths, respectively, we can rewrite equation (1) in log-linearized form as
and the Euler equation as
where p t logðP t =P tÀ1 Þ À logðpÞ and p ¼ P t =P tÀ1 along the balanced-growth path. The log deviation of the interest rate r t is defined as r t logðR t =RÞ. We allow the log of steady-state inflation to differ from zero, as in Hornstein and Wolman (2005) , Cogley and Sbordone (2008) , and Ascari and Ropele (2009) . The log deviation of inflation from its steady-state value is a weighted average of sector specific inflation rates, 6 Technically this implies that the relative price level of rule-of-thumb firms is indeterminate in a stationary steady state. This can be avoided by assuming a Poisson probability 1Àd rot that each firm is allowed to set its price equal to P # t . Taking the limit as d rot goes to 1 leads to a well-defined relative price level equal to P # /P. We omit this in the text for simplicity but assume it implicitly later when we characterize the steady state.
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Because inflation is not zero on average, sticky price firms have to take into account the fact that prices will tend to rise on average. From Equation (6) 
To the extent that the extra weight attached to s 1 will in general not be equal to 1, the optimal relative price will also then differ from 1. In particular, when p > 1, there exists a unique b Ã ðh; x; d sp ; pÞ such that if b > b*, the steady-state average relative price level of sticky price firms is greater than 1, while the optimal relative price is less than 1.
7 This is because when trend inflation is positive, the relative reset price chosen by sticky price firms declines over time as the aggregate price level rises. If firms care enough about future profits, then they must choose a high reset price today to avoid the relative reset price being too low in the distant future. This will cause the average relative price level of sticky price firms to be greater than 1.
If the steady-state average relative price level of a sector d is greater than 1, then its share in the final good will be lower than implied by its mass in the output index, that is, s CPI d < s d . Consequently, price changes in this sector will have a smaller effect on aggregate inflation than would be the case if it had a steady-state relative price of 1, as can be seen in Equation (13). Because b > b* in all of our estimates, we have s CPI 1 < s 1 . From Equation (4) and the definition of the real marginal cost, the log-linearized deviation of the instantaneously optimal relative price is given by
Defining b t as the log deviation of B t /P t from its stationary steady-state value and log-linearizing equation (6), expressed in stationary variables, around the balanced-growth path leads to the following expression for the reset price,
where gy t : log (Y t / Y tÀ1 ) À log a is the log deviation of the growth rate of output from its mean.
Denoting the log deviation of the relative price level in sector d from its steady-state value as p
t =P t Þ, the log-linearized relative price level of sticky price firms follows
where the steady-state ratio of reset prices to the stickyprice level is given by
For sticky information firms, the log-linearized optimal relative price at time t conditional on information dated t À k is p si tjtÀk ¼ E tÀk p # t so the log-linearized relative price level for sticky information firms can be expressed as
Since the inflation rate for rule-of-thumb firms is
the log-linearized relative price level of rule-of-thumb firms follows
Inflation of flexible-price full information firms is
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor (1993) type rule with interest smoothing such that
7 We formally prove this result in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) . 8 For these sums to be well defined in the steady state requires that c 2 < 1. Note that we express the reset price in terms of optimal prices rather than real marginal costs. The reason is that real marginal costs are also a function of the price dispersion D t . With nonzero trend inflation, this dispersion term has first-order effects. By expressing price-setting decisions in terms of desired optimal prices, we reduce the state space of the model by eliminating the need to keep track of the dynamics of price dispersion. 9 For the relative reset price to be well defined in equilibrium requires the additional condition that d sp p 1Àh < 1.
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which allows the central bank to respond to inflation and the growth rate of output. 10 We include two lags of the interest rate on the right-hand side of equation (20) because in our previous work, we document (e.g., Gorodnichenko & Shapiro, 2007; Coibion & Gorodnichenko, 2011) that two lags appear to be the appropriate statistical description of serial correlation in the policy rule. The policy innovations e r,t are assumed to be independently distributed with mean zero and variance r 2 r .
III. Estimation Approach
Our log-linearized model has three variables that correspond directly to observable macroeconomic series: the inflation rate, the growth rate of output, and the nominal interest rate. The advantage of focusing on output growth rather than the output gap, as traditionally done, is that output growth is directly observable, whereas the output gap is not.
11 To estimate the underlying parameters of the model, we use a method-of-moments approach that seeks to match the contemporaneous and intertemporal covariances of the observable variables from the data to those of the model. After solving our model for the unique rational expectations equilibrium and letting C denote the vector of parameters in the model, we can rewrite it in reduced form as
with the measurement equation
where F t $ iid(0, P F (C)) is the vector of structural shocks, X t is the vector of variables in the model,
0 is the vector of observable variables, U is the appropriate known fixed selection matrix, and X t $ iid(0, P X (C)) is the vector of serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated measurement errors with P N ¼ diagfr 2 me;gy ; r 2 me;p ; r 2 me;r g.
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Using this state-space representation of the model, we can extract the corresponding moments of the model for the observable variables and denote the resulting matrix with where W is a weighting matrix. Following Abowd and Card (1989) , Altonji and Segal (1996) , and others, we use the identity weighting matrix in the estimation of the covariance structure.
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Most work on estimating DSGE models relies on maximum likelihood or Bayesian approaches. We follow our alternative method-of-moments approach for several reasons. First, Ruge-Murcia (2007) compares method-ofmoments estimators with other popular methods such as maximum likelihood for estimating DGSE models and finds that it performs well in simulations. Second, a particularly appealing feature of our method-of-moments approach is that the moments of the data used in the estimation have an economic interpretation. Comparing the predicted moments of the model to those of the data highlights which features of the data can and cannot be matched by the model. As we discuss in section IV B, our method-of-moments estimator thus allows us to shed light on why the pure models are rejected in favor of the hybrid model. Thus, we interpret our empirical approach as one way to get inside the black box of estimated DSGE models.
14 Finally, we use simulation-based methods to estimate structural parameters without requiring the researcher to take a stand on priors. Our simulation-based method illustrates how medium-and large-scale models can be estimated within the classical statistical framework.
IV. Results
We use U.S. data from 1984:Q1 until 2008:Q2. 15 The growth of output is measured as 400 Â log(RGDP t / RGDP tÀ1 ), where RGDP is chained real GDP. Inflation is measured using the CPI by 400 Â log(P t /P tÀ1 ). The interest rate is 400 Â log(1þR t ), where R t is the effective federal funds rate (at a quarterly rate). We focus on the 10 We follow Ireland (2004) and allow the central bank to respond to output growth rather than some measure of the output gap. Our qualitative results are insensitive to the inclusion of an additional output gap term in the Taylor rule, as shown in section IV D.
11 In addition, the theoretically motivated output gap would tend to be poorly approximated by standard detrending methods (see Andres, Lopez-Salido, & Nelson, 2005) . Gorodnichenko and Ng (2010) also show that using growth rates of variables could lead to better statistical estimates than using levels of persistent variables.
12 Sargent (1989) , Watson (1993) , and others emphasize the importance of measurement errors in reported macroeconomic variables as well as in improving the fit of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. We introduce measurement errors to absorb those short-term fluctuations in macroeconomic variables that are unrelated to structural shocks. 13 These authors find that W equal to the identity matrix performs better than the optimal weighting matrix in the context of estimating covariance structures. The optimal weighting matrix, which contains high-order moments, tends to correlate with the moments, and this correlation undermines the performance of the method-of-moments estimator. We investigate the robustness of our results to the weighting matrix in section IV D.
14 One could, of course, study the same predicted moments as we do based on alternative estimation procedures. However, it is well known that when one estimates a model using one set of moments, the resulting estimates may then fare poorly on an alternative set of moments (see Dupor, Han, and Tsai, 2009 ). Thus, we use moments that have an intuitive economic interpretation in the estimation procedure to derive greater insight into why the estimated parameters come out the way they do. This task is harder to accomplish with alternative estimators such as MLE. 15 We focus on this period rather than the full sample because of the structural break in the monetary policy reaction function, as well as trend inflation that occurred in the early 1980s.
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contemporaneous covariances and the first three crossautocovariances of these series to estimate the parameters of the model. We restrict the number of autocovariances to minimize the computational burden and sharpen inference as the plethora of weakly informative moments tends to deteriorate the estimator's performance. 16 Our model contains the following set of parameters: W ¼ fa; R; p; b; g; h; h; d si ; d sp ; s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; / p ; / gy ; q 1 ; q 2 ; q g ; r r ; r a ; r me;gy ; r me;p ; r me;r g. We calibrate the balancedgrowth inflation rate, interest rate, and growth rate of output to those observed in our sample, p ¼ 1:0077, a ¼ 1.0076, R ¼ 1:0130, and we impose b ¼ 0.99 to guarantee that the consumer's problem is well bounded. We set g ¼ 1, a fairly typical calibrated value for the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and set y ¼ 10 such that the steady-state markup is about 11%. We experiment with alternative values of g and y in robustness checks. We choose to calibrate these parameters rather than estimate them because these parameters have known identification problems. For example, Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) and Canova and Sala (2009) report that standard monetary models have difficulties in distinguishing real (which is governed by g and y) and nominal (which is governed by d sp and d si ) rigidities. All other parameters are estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, with details provided in the appendix. We set the truncation of past expectations for the sticky information firms to p ¼ 12. We restrict the degree of habit formation, the shares of firms, and the persistence of the preference shock to be between 0 and 1. Price and informational rigidities (d sp and d si , respectively) are restricted to be between 0.3 and 0.95.
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A. Baseline Estimates Table 1 presents our baseline estimates for the hybrid model, as well as estimation results for restricted models. For our baseline model, the degree of habit persistence, at 0.79, is well within the range of estimates found in other studies. Our Taylor rule estimates imply strong responses by the central bank to both inflation and the growth rate of out- The table presents estimates of the baseline model, using a truncation of past expectations for sticky information firms of p ¼ 12, as well as estimates of restricted models. We use contemporaneous covariances and cross-autocovariances up to three lags. Data are from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q2. Standard errors are constructed using nonparametric bootstrap. Bootstraps are done by running a four-lag VAR on our data and using the VAR coefficients and residuals to generate 2,000 replications of the data, which are used to reestimate the model in each bootstrap replication. Minimum v 2 statistic is computed as in Newey (1985) . P-value DD test is the simulated probability value for the distance difference test (based on the difference in minimum v 2 statistics) of imposed restrictions. See the text and appendix for details on estimation approach. 16 We consider the effect of using more moments in the robustness section, IV D. 17 The lower bound on pricing and information rigidities is imposed to avoid identification issues, since when these rigidities are low, firms in these sectors behave very much like flexible price, full information firms, making identification of shares of firms tenuous. Likewise, we set an upper bound to avoid scenarios where firms reset prices very infrequently. In our estimation procedure, we also restrict parameters to be consistent with a unique determinate rational expectation equilibrium. We calculated that for the baseline specification, the MCMC chain generated less than 0.05% of draws, which led to nonuniqueness or nonexistence. Thus, most of our draws were away from the indeterminacy region. In addition, when we ran multiple long (2 million draws or more) chains, we observed that the averages across chains converged to very similar values as our baseline estimates, which is consistent with the chains exploring the parameter space sufficiently well. We also reran chains while fixing close-to-boundary parameters and found similar point estimates and standard errors for other parameters. Results are available on request.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS put, with substantial inertia apparent in the interest rate. The weight assigned to sticky price firms is 62%. Sticky information firms receive a weight of 21%. Thus, sticky prices and sticky information jointly account for over 80% of firms in the model. Rule-of-thumb firms account for 9% of firms, while flexible price firms receive a share of 8%. If we adjust the shares to reflect the fact that sticky price firms charge higher prices on average than other sectors, the effective share of sticky price firms falls to 59%, while the effective share of sticky information firms rises to 23%. The estimated degree of price rigidity d sp is 0.81, which implies that sticky price firms update their prices every five quarters on average. Note that while this is higher than typical estimates of price rigidities (Bils & Klenow, 2004 , Nakamura & Steinsson, 2008 , the average price duration across all firms is on the order of three quarters, which is consistent with the literature. Sticky information firms, with an estimated degree of informational rigidity of 0.95, update their information sets only infrequently, which is consistent with estimated degrees of informational rigidities in Khan and Zhu (2006) and Knotek (2009) over the post-1982 period. Because no single firm type receives a share of 100%, the first implication of our results is that our nested model best matches the data when more than a single type of firm is present. However, sticky price and sticky information firms jointly account for most of the firms in the economy. To assess the relative importance of each type of firm, we consider restricted estimates of our models in table 1. One version eliminates rule-of-thumb firms. The share of sticky price firms rises to 63%, while that of sticky information goes to 23% of firms. The model achieves only a slightly higher value of the objective function than the baseline case, indicating that rule-of-thumb firms contribute little to the ability of the model to match the data. When one eliminates sticky information firms, on the other hand, the model fares worse in matching moments, and we can reject this restriction at the 1% significance level. Thus, while rule-of-thumb firms do not appear to play a significant role in matching moments of the data, the sticky information firms certainly do. Finally, we consider a specification in which both rule-of-thumb and flexible firms are set to 0. This version of the model yields a distribution of firms of about three-quarters sticky price firms and one-quarter sticky information firms, and we cannot reject this restriction at 10% significance level.
Thus, the most striking result from our estimation is that sticky price and sticky information firms play the most important role in matching the moments of the data. When one accounts for these two types of firms, there is little need to allow for rule-of-thumb behavior or flexible price full information firms. This result is particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, much of the literature on sticky prices and sticky information has focused on testing one model against the other (Korenok, 2008; Kiley, 2007; Coibion, 2010) . Our results imply instead that both are needed to match the moments of the data. Second, sticky price models are commonly augmented with rule-of-thumb firms to introduce more inflation inertia (Gali & Gertler, 1999) . However, when one allows for both rule-of-thumb and sticky information firms, the data favor sticky information as a complement to sticky price models.
B. How Does the Hybrid Model Differ from the Nested
Pure Models?
In this section, we study why the data prefer a hybrid sticky price, sticky information model over the pure models. First, we reestimate the structural parameters of the model under the assumption that only one type of firm exists and construct variance decompositions for each estimated model. Second, we compare the predicted moments of the hybrid and pure models to those of the data. Third, we contrast the impulse response functions of each estimated model.
Estimates of pure models. To get a sense of how the hybrid model differs from pure models, we first reestimate the parameters while imposing that the model be entirely composed of sticky price, sticky information, or flexible price full information firms. The results are presented in table 2. Note first that the sticky price model achieves the lowest value of the objective function after the hybrid model, the sticky information model comes second, and the flexible price model does much worse. For all three restricted models, p-values for the restrictions imposed by these models are less than or equal to 5%. In addition, there are some notable differences in estimated parameters across models. The sticky price model points to somewhat stronger responses by the Fed to inflation and output growth than in the hybrid model, while the sticky information model yields a much larger response to output growth but a smaller response to inflation. For estimated shock processes, the biggest difference is that the standard deviation of technology shocks is much lower in the sticky information model than in other models.
The differences in the estimates have important implications for the relative importance attributed to each shock in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. Table 3 presents the one-year-ahead variance decompositions of output growth, inflation, and interest rates due to structural shocks in each model. 18 For output growth, all of the models yield the con- 18 The share of variance attributed to measurement error is 51%, 68%, and 0.2% for output growth rate, inflation rate, and interest rate, respectively. Although the measurement errors soak up a relatively large fraction of contemporaneous variation in output growth and inflation, they have no effect on (auto)covariances, which the model can match well. The main reason we have to rely on measurement errors is that there is a clear break in the size of the autocovariances of output growth rate and inflation rate. These estimates are in line with previous studies. For example, Watson (1993) reports that the share of errors in the statistical model of the economy should be in the 40% to 60% range of total variation when one uses a basic real business cycle model. These estimates are also consistent with the amount of sampling uncertainty in macroeconomic series. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2010) report that the standard deviation of the sampling error alone in the CPI quarterly inflation rate is about 0.5. The standard deviation of the inflation rate in the sample they analyzed is 0.68, so that the measurement error can easily account for 50% of variation in the inflation rate.
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clusion that most of the variance is due to preference shocks. For inflation, there is much more variation across models. The hybrid and sticky price models attribute much of the variance of inflation to technology and preference shocks. Both sticky information and flexible models, on the other hand, attribute much more importance to monetary policy innovations. With respect to interest rate fluctuations, all of the models attribute much of the variation to preference shocks, although the sticky information model again attributes some role (25%) to monetary policy innovations, while the flexible model assigns a sizable weight to technology shocks. Overall, the sticky price model yields a variance decomposition of macroeconomic variables that closely mirrors that of the hybrid model, with preference shocks being most important but with technology shocks playing a key role in explaining inflation. The sticky information model places little weight on technology shocks and instead assigns a much larger role to monetary policy innovations.
Comparing predicted moments. To further contrast the pure and hybrid models, we consider which features of the data each model can match. Figure 1 presents the autocovariances of the observable variables implied by the models and those found in the data, as well as 95% confidence intervals derived from a nonparametric bootstrap.
19 First and most dramatic, the flexible price model is unable to reproduce the high autocovariance of interest rates and output growth rate observed in the data. Second, all other models adequately reproduce the autocorrelation of output The table presents estimates of the pure models where firms use only one pricing mechanism and of the weighted model where aggregate dynamics is the sum of noninteracting economies with a single type of price setting. In the weighted model, s 3 is set to 0 since inflation does not respond to shocks when only ROT firms are present. We use contemporaneous covariances and cross-autocovariances up to three lags. The truncation of past expectations for sticky information firms is p ¼ 12. Data are from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q2. Standard errors are constructed using nonparametric bootstrap. Bootstraps are done by running a four-lag VAR on our data and using the VAR coefficients and residuals to generate 2,000 replications of the data which are used to reestimate the model in each bootstrap replication. Minimum v 2 statistic is computed as in Newey (1985) . P-value DD test is the simulated probability value for the distance difference test (based on the difference in minimum v 2 statistics) of imposed restrictions. See the text and appendix for details on estimation approach.
19 The bootstrap is done by running a VAR(4) on our measures of GDP growth, inflation, and interest rates over the same time period as our sample. We then use the VAR to simulate new data of the same length and calculate the auto-and cross-covariances from the simulated data. We use 2,000 bootstraps to generate 95% confidence intervals.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS growth and interest rates, largely because this is driven by the estimates of internal habit formation and high interest rate smoothing in the central bank's reaction function. Third, the sticky information model tends to somewhat overstate the persistence of inflation. Figure 2 presents the cross-covariances of inflation with respect to leads and lags of output growth and interest rates, as well as that of output growth to leads and lags of interest rates. The moments of the data indicate that inflation leads output growth and interest rates, such that high inflation today is associated with higher interest rates and lower output growth in subsequent quarters. In addition, output growth leads interest rates. The fully flexible model is largely incapable of reproducing these lead-lag characteristics of the data. The sticky information model has difficulty reproducing the fact that inflation leads output growth and interest rates: in the case of output growth, the sticky information model predicts that the highest covariance (in absolute value) is contemporaneous, while in the case of interest rates, the sticky information model predicts that inflation should lag interest rates. The sticky price model, on the other hand, replicates these lead-lag patterns more precisely. This reflects the forward-looking behavior embodied in the reset-price decisions of sticky price firms. The hybrid model overall yields dynamics that are very similar to those of the sticky price model. Impulse responses. To understand why the sticky information model places more weight on monetary policy shocks but less weight on technology than either the hybrid or pure sticky price model, we consider in figure 3 the impulse responses of the observable variables to one-unit shocks in the estimated hybrid, sticky price, and sticky information models.
20
Consider first the effects of preference shocks, since these shocks account for the brunt of the variance decomposition of macroeconomic variables across models. In 
-AUTOCOVARIANCES OF OBSERVABLE VARIABLES
The figure plots autocovariances of the observable variables in the data (1984:Q1-2008:Q2) , as the solid lines, as well as those predicted by the hybrid model and pure models (using estimates in tables 1 and 2), as the bold dashed lines. The gray-shaded areas are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Bootstraps are done by running a four-lag VAR on our data and using the VAR coefficients and residuals to generate 2,000 replications of the data, from which we generate a distribution of autocovariances. The horizontal axis indicates the timing in quarters of the lagged variable used in the autocovariance. 20 We omit responses from the flexible price model because flexible price and rule-of-thumb firms account for a small fraction of firms in the hybrid model and the responses of flexible firms are very large on impact and dwarf those of the other models. The estimates for each model are taken from table 2.
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response to preference shocks, output growth jumps up and returns monotonically back to 0 over time. This response is similar across models and is driven by the estimated habit formation parameter and the persistence of the shock. The rapid decline in output growth helps match the autocorrelation function of output growth for all models. The gradual increase in the interest rate helps replicate the observation that output growth leads interest rates in the data. Because inflation is positive after this shock (albeit with a lag for sticky information), this shock can also help replicate the positive correlation between inflation and interest rates observed in the data. However, it cannot explain the contemporaneous negative correlation between inflation and output growth. For the sticky information model, the delayed response of inflation to the preference shock causes inflation to lag output growth and interest rates, a result at odds with the data.
When we turn to technology shocks, the key findings for sticky price and hybrid models are the contemporaneous decrease in inflation and increase in output growth. This response allows these two models to replicate the unconditional negative correlation between inflation and output growth observed in the data. In addition, because inflation jumps down on impact and returns rapidly to the steady state while output growth converges only slowly after this permanent shock, this shock allows the sticky price and hybrid models to replicate the finding that inflation leads output growth. This accounts for the substantial weight assigned to this shock by the sticky price and hybrid models in accounting for inflation dynamics. For the sticky information model, the permanent nature of the technology shock yields a very delayed response of inflation, which again tends to counterfactually imply that inflation lags output growth.
In response to monetary policy shocks, the increase in the interest rate leads to a decrease in output growth and inflation across models. Since this tends to imply a negative correlation between output growth and interest rates, as well as between inflation and interest rates, the sticky price and hybrid models assign almost no weight to this shock, as the key lead lag relationships are already accounted for by the preference and technology shocks. However, we can see from this impulse response why monetary policy shocks play such an important role for the sticky information 
-CROSS-COVARIANCES OF OBSERVABLE VARIABLES
The figure plots cross-autocovariances of the observable variables: output growth (gy), inflation (p), and interest rates (r) in the data (1984:Q1-2008:Q2) and those predicted by the hybrid model, as well as those predicted by the pure models, (using estimates in table 1). Solid lines are from data, while dashed lines are those of each model. The gray-shaded areas are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Bootstraps are done by running a four-lag VAR on our data and using the VAR coefficients and residuals to generate 2,000 replications of the data, from which we generate a distribution of cross-autocovariances. The horizontal axis indicates the timing of the variable used in the cross-autocovariances (negative numbers indicate lags; positive numbers are leads).
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS model. Note that inflation declines for a number of quarters after a monetary policy shock under the sticky information model, a point Mankiw and Reis (2002) emphasized. The interest rate, on the other hand, peaks in the second quarter and then returns monotonically back to 0. Thus, after the first period, the correlation between inflation and the interest rate is positive in the sticky information model as inflation and interest rates decline simultaneously. In addition, because inflation falls in the first period while the interest rate starts to decline only in the second period, this shock helps deliver a lead of inflation over interest rates, which was the feature of the data that the sticky information model could not match with preference and technology shocks.
C. How Important Is Strategic Interaction among Different Price-Setting Firms?
To see how the behavior of firms within the hybrid model compares to their behavior when they are the only type of firm, we plot in figure 4 the response of inflation in each sector to structural shocks, as well as the response of aggregate inflation in a model consisting of only this type of firm. For the latter, we use the estimated parameters of the hybrid model and simply alter the share of firms to isolate the strategic interaction effect.
21
Focusing first on sticky price firms, in response to monetary policy, technology, and preference shocks, inflation among sticky price firms within a hybrid model is substantially dampened (by about 30% on impact) relative to what it would have been had these been the only type of firm in the model. For sticky information firms, the effect is reversed: their inflation response is more rapid within the hybrid model than in a pure sticky information model. This is strategic complementarity at work: the resulting inflation responses in each sector are much more similar than the 
-IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
The figure plots impulse responses (percentage deviation from steady state) of baseline (hybrid), pure sticky price, and pure sticky information models (based on estimates reported in tables 1 and 2) to a unit innovation to monetary policy, preference shock, and technology. Time is in quarters on the horizontal axis. 21 With policy responding to endogenous variables, the behavior of firms in pure models should differ from the hybrid model even in the absence of pricing complementarities. To address this issue, we considered a version of the model with exogenous money supply and a money demand curve. The results were almost identical to those reported in the paper, so we can argue that the dynamics in figure 4 are driven largely by strategic complementarity in price setting rather than by the endogenous response of monetary policymakers. However, we cannot eliminate the indirect interaction of firms by aggregate demand, which is present in the hybrid model and absent in the weighted sum of pure models. Thus, by comparing the hybrid and weighted sum of pure models, we observe the joint effect of direct (pricing complementarities) and indirect (aggregate demand) interaction between firms. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing these issues out.
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inflation responses of the pure models. The effect of strategic complementarity is even more striking in the case of flexible price full information firms. Whereas inflation for these firms would be substantial on impact, but virtually nil in subsequent periods, within the hybrid model, their inflation response is severely dampened. This reflects how much more sensitive these firms are to the behavior of other firms because they are unconstrained in their actions, whereas all other firms face some kind of constraint, which is similar in spirit to Haltiwanger and Waldman (1991) . In the bottom row of figure 4 we contrast the dynamics of aggregate inflation in the hybrid model and the dynamics of the weightedsum of inflation in the pure models. We interpret the weighted sum dynamics as a case where consumers have a two-tier utility function with very low elasticity of substitution across sectors and y ¼ 10 elasticity of substitution within sectors. 22 The hybrid model exhibits more gradual and persistent dynamics than the weighted sum over pure models, suggesting that ignoring strategic interaction between firms with different price setting may considerably distort the aggregate dynamics.
To assess more formally the quantitative importance of strategic interaction in price setting across sectors, we reestimate all of the parameters of our model but applied to a weighted sum of sector-specific models (the weighted model). In other words, for a given set of parameters, we feed these parameters into three separate economies where each economy is characterized by a single price-setting type (sticky price, sticky information, and flexible-price full information) and use a weighted sum of these economies to construct the aggregates, from which we construct the predicted moments for the weighted model. 23 Although the estimates are broadly similar to our baseline results, we find that the share of sticky price firms falls while the share of sticky information firms increases so that each type constitutes approximately 50% (see table 2). However, the fit of the weighted model is considerably worse than the fit of the baseline model. Based on tests of the overidentifying restrictions, we can reject the validity of the weighted model but not that of the baseline model at any standard 22 In other words, the economy is split into four islands, each populated with a single type of price-setting firm; there is no direct interaction across islands by pricing complementarities, input and output markets as well as any macroeconomic variable; aggregate behavior is a (weighted) sum of dynamics across islands. We then compare these aggregate dynamics with the dynamics in the hybrid model when different types of firms are allowed to interact. 23 Note that we dropped rule-of-thumb firms because this model yields a zero response of inflation to all shocks in the absence of other firms.
932
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS significance level. This result illustrates that strategic interaction across sectors within the hybrid model is a key element to match the data.
D. Robustness Analysis
In this section, we consider the robustness of our estimates to several potential issues. The first issue we address is the set of moments used in the estimation. Our baseline results relied on the autocorrelations of our observable variables over three quarters and dynamic cross-correlations at maximum leads and lags of three quarters as well. The purpose of focusing on such a restricted set of moments was to concentrate on those moments that are most precisely estimated. As a robustness check, we consider the use of a larger set of moments, specifically using autocovariances over two years, and report results in table 4. Most of the parameters are similar to baseline estimates. The estimated levels of price and informational rigidities are almost identical to our baseline estimates, and the estimated shares of firms continue to imply that more than 80% of firms are sticky price or sticky information firms.
An alternative approach to dealing with the precision of the moments used in the estimation is to allow a nonidentity weighting matrix. Although the optimal weighting matrix would seem an ideal candidate, many studies report poor performance of this weighting matrix in applications (Boivin & Giannoni, 2006) and Monte Carlo simulations (Altonji & Segal, 1996) that involve estimation of covariance structures. 24 A practical compromise is a diagonal weighting matrix with estimated variances of the moments on the diagonal and zeros for off-diagonal entries. Replicating our baseline estimation procedure with the diagonal weighting matrix, we find that sticky price firms account for approximately 50% of firms, while rule-of-thumb and sticky information firms account for 18% and 16%, respectively. Essentially, the use of the diagonal weight matrix downplays some informative moments and does not allow us to clearly separate rule-of-thumb and sticky information firms. Most other parameter estimates are broadly similar to the estimates based on the identity weight matrix.
We also consider sensitivity to the elasticity of labor supply. While most empirical work has found low elasticities of labor supply, some of the RBC literature has focused on the case with infinite labor supply (as in Hansen, 1985) . In We use contemporaneous covariances and cross-autocovariances up to three lags unless otherwise specified. Data are from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q2. In the scenario ''More Moments,'' we use contemporaneous covariances and cross-autocovariances up to eight lags. Standard errors are constructed using nonparametric bootstrap. Bootstraps are done by running a four-lag VAR on our data and using the VAR coefficients and residuals to generate 2,000 replications of the data, which are used to reestimate the model in each bootstrap replication. Minimum v 2 statistic is computed as in Newey (1985) . P-value DD test is the probability value for the distance difference test (based on the difference in minimum v 2 statistics) of imposed restrictions. See the text and appendix for details on estimation approach. table 4, we present estimates of the hybrid model under the assumption of indivisible labor (g ¼ ?), which implies that x ¼ 0 so that there is no strategic complementarity in price setting, although (in contrast to the weighted model) there is some interaction via aggregate demand. Eliminating strategic complementary has a dramatic effect on the results. Specifically, the shares of both sticky information and flexible price firms go to 0, while that of rule-of-thumb firms rises to 50%. This change in outcome leads to a substantial deterioration in the model's ability to match the data, and we can reject the model at any standard significance level using tests of the overidentifying restrictions. The reduced share of sticky information firms reflects the fact that in the absence of strategic complementarity in price setting, sticky information firms fail to produce inflation inertia (Coibion, 2006) . Because sticky price firms tend to induce excessive forward-looking behavior in inflation, the model needs other types of firms to slow the adjustment of inflation to shocks. With sticky information firms unable to achieve this role in the absence of strategic complementarity, the estimation instead places a significant weight on rule-of-thumb firms.
As a check, we explore the effects of using alternative policy reaction functions. First, we consider the following Taylor rule, r t ¼ð1Àq 1 Àq 2 Þ½/ p p t þ/ gy gy t þ/ x x t þq 1 r tÀ1 þ q 2 r tÀ2 þe r;t , where x t is the log deviation between actual output and the level of output that would occur in the absence of price and informational rigidities. The estimated response to the output gap is very low and not statistically different from 0, while the other parameters are largely unchanged. Second, we integrate the following Taylor rule into our model, r t ¼ ð1 À q 1 Þ½/ p p t þ / gy gy t þq 1 r tÀ1 þ e r;t , which restricts interest smoothing to be an AR(1) process. With this restriction, the main results are broadly unchanged, with sticky price firms accounting for 60% of firms and sticky information firms accounting for 15%. The share of flexible price firms rises to 16%. However, we can reject imposing an AR(1) specification at the 5% significance level.
The estimated degree of information rigidity d si implies that firms update their information sets infrequently. Although the estimate of d si is consistent with previous studies, a large value of d si may imply that the results are sensitive to the truncation lag p. To verify that our results are insensitive to the choice of p ¼ 12, we reestimate the model with p ¼ 24 and find very similar results, as illustrated in table 4. In particular, the estimated degree of information rigidity and the share of sticky information firms are unchanged.
Our final robustness check is with respect to the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods y. We fixed this parameter in our baseline estimation because previous work has shown that it is difficult to differentiate empirically between nominal and real rigidities, making the joint identification of y and the shares of firms tenuous. To assess how sensitive our results are to y, we redid our baseline estimation procedure for values of y ranging from 7 to 15. Our results for the key parameters of interest, shares of firms and the degree of price and information rigidities, are in figure 5. In panel A, we can see that lower values of y have a substantial effect on estimated shares of firms. Specifically, the share of sticky information firms declines rapidly, while that of sticky price firms rises. As lower values of y reduce strategic complementarity in price setting, we get higher estimates of price rigidity to keep the persistence of inflation high (panel B). However, the fit of the model worsens substantially as strategic complementarity decreases moderately (panel C). With higher values of y, the estimated shares of firms are very similar to our baseline estimates under the assumption of y ¼ 10. As y rises, the degree of strategic complementarity increases ((1 þ x)/(1 + xy) decreases and prices become less sensitive to changes in output; see panel D), as does the inherent persistence of inflation, and hence we obtain lower estimates of price rigidity. The fit of the model actually improves with higher values of y, indicating that even more strategic complementarity is desirable to match the data. Thus, one could interpret our baseline results as a lower bound on the importance of strategic complementarity in price setting across heterogeneous price-setting firms.
V. Implications for Optimal Monetary Policy
The presence of different types of firms in the model raises the issue of what kind of monetary policy is optimal in such a setting. To assess the effect of different policies, we follow much of the literature and assume that the central banker has the following loss function,
where x y and x r show the weight on output gap and interest rate volatility relative to inflation volatility so that the variability in the output gap (and later the output growth rate) and the interest rate are converted to their inflation-variance equivalents. We also consider an alternative loss function, which penalizes the volatility of output growth instead of the volatility of the output gap:
This alternative loss function may be interesting for our analysis because, as Amato and Laubach (2004) show, habit formation introduces a concern for the volatility in the change of consumption and, hence, the loss function should include a term that captures the volatility of output growth. In principle, the parameter x y can be derived from the Phillips curve. However, because we have different interacting price-setting mechanisms as well as nonzero steady-state inflation, we could not find a closed-form solution for the Phillips curve and x y , so objective functions (21) and (22) output gap variability, and we experiment with different values of x y . In the baseline scenario, we set x y ¼ 1. The last term in the loss function is the penalty for the volatility of the policy instrument (interest rate), which helps to keep the optimal responses to output growth and inflation bounded. We follow Woodford (2003) and calibrate x r ¼ 0.077. We constrain our analysis to simple rules with fixed coefficients (undercommitment) similar to the estimated interest rate rule (20) for reasons highlighted in Williams (2003) . First, simple rules can often closely approximate fully optimal rules. Second, simple rules tend to be more robust. Third, with many sectors and the complicated structure of the model, we could not find a closed-form solution of the objective function and hence could not derive fully optimal rules.
The first question we pose is whether the central bank could have achieved lower losses by responding differently to aggregate inflation and output growth than what is implied by our estimates of the Taylor rule. In the exercise, we assume that the estimated shares of firms, the degrees of nominal and informational rigidities, and other estimated parameters do not change with the policy rule. Panel A in figure 6 presents the isoloss maps for different combinations of / p and / gy in the Taylor rule. Generally there are substantial gains from increasing the response to inflation, which reduces the volatility of inflation, the interest rate, and the output gap. Holding everything else constant, a more aggressive response to inflation decreases the volatility of inflation, the interest rate, and the output gap and weakly increases the volatility of output growth. In contrast, a stronger response to the output growth rate has the opposite effect on the volatility of relevant macroeconomic variables. Since the volatility of output growth is fairly insensitive to changes in / p The second question we ask is whether the optimal policies in pure sticky price and sticky information models are similar to those found in the hybrid model. In particular, one THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS may be concerned that using pure models to design policy rules can misguide policymakers about trade-offs. Because scales of the social loss maps vary across models, we compute isoloss maps for pure sticky price (PSP) and pure sticky information (PSI) models and normalize these maps by the corresponding values of the loss function evaluated at the estimated Taylor rule parameters. These rescaled isoloss maps, which we call relative welfare maps, can be interpreted as losses relative to the loss incurred when a policymaker uses the estimated Taylor rule. We also scale the isoloss map for the hybrid model and then divide the relative welfare for the PSP and PSI models by the relative welfare map for the hybrid model. In summary, we consider maps The figure plots isoloss maps for two welfare functions L 1 and L 2 for various combinations of the policy reaction function (Taylor rule) . Volatilities of the variables are computed using the parameter estimates of the hybrid model. The star indicates the position of the estimated Taylor rule. A, B, and C: / gy on the horizontal axis shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in the output growth rate. On the vertical axis, / p shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in inflation. Other parameters in the Taylor rule (interest rate smoothing, volatility of the interest rate shock) are held constant. D: The figures in brackets show the value of the social loss function evaluated at the estimated Taylor rule. On the horizontal axis, / PLT shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in the deviation of the price level from its target. On the vertical axis, / p shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in inflation. Other parameters in the Taylor rule (interest rate smoothing, volatility of the interest rate shock, output growth rate response) are held constant E: / p:SPþROTþFLEX on the horizontal axis shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in aggregate inflation in the sticky information, rule-of-thumb, and flexible price sectors. On the vertical axis, / p:SP shows the long-run response of the policy instrument (interest rate) to a unit increase in inflation in the sticky price sector. Other parameters in the Taylor rule (interest rate smoothing, volatility of the interest rate shock, output growth rate response) are held constant. The shaded region shows the Taylor rule parameter combinations associated with equilibrium indeterminacy.
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the degree of forward-looking behavior in inflation. In contrast, previous work that emphasized the time-series representation of the data could not readily provide an economic rationale for why one model is preferred to others.
Heterogeneity in price setting poses important issues for policymakers. We demonstrate that focusing on models with a single price-setting mechanism can misinform central bankers about trade-offs they face. Our simulations suggest that a more aggressive response to inflation, which may include an element of price-level targeting, could substantially improve social welfare functions. At the same time, we do not find large benefits from targeting sectors with some particular form of price setting so that targeting aggregate inflation is a reasonable strategy.
While we focus on the possibility of important differences in how firms set prices, this approach could be naturally extended to wage-setting decisions. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , for example, argue that sticky wages with indexation are a particularly important element in matching macroeconomic dynamics. Yet, as with prices, allowing indexation cannot reproduce the fact that wages often do not change for extended periods of time. A more natural approach could be to allow heterogeneity in wage-setting assumptions for different sectors of the economy to capture the fact that some sectors have highly flexible wages, others have sticky wages without indexation, and some sectors, particularly those under union contracts, choose time paths for future wages infrequently. Even with small sticky wage or union wage sectors, the behavior of the flexible wage sector could be substantially altered if there is strategic complementarity in wage setting.
where J(C (n) ) is the value of the objective function at the current state of the chain and J(Y (n) ) is the value of the objective function using the candidate vector of parameter values.
The initial X w is calibrated to about 1% of the parameter value and then adjusted on the fly for the first 100,000 draws to generate 0.3 acceptance rates of candidate draws, as proposed in Gelman et al. (2004) .
is a consistent estimate of C under standard regularity assumptions of GMM estimators. CH also prove that the covariance matrix of the estimate of C is given by T À1 VXV, where X ¼ DWGWD 0 , W in the weighting matrix, D is the Jacobian of the moment conditions, T is sample size, G is the covariance of moment conditions, and V ¼ 1 N P N n¼1 ðW ðnÞ À WÞ 2 ¼ varðW ðnÞ Þ. Note that if W is the optimal weight matrix, the covariance matrix is given by V. Given the short samples and highly nonlinear optimization, we employ bootstrapbased standard errors, which we find to have better coverage rates. Our bootstrap procedure can be summarized as follows: (a) we estimate a VAR, (b) resample the residuals, (c) construct new series using the resampled residuals and estimated VAR, (d) estimate the parameters on newly created data, (e) repeat steps b to d many times, and (f) compute standard errors based on bootstrap replications. We found in simulations that this procedure has superior statistical properties.
We use 500,000 draws for our baseline and robustness estimates and drop the first 100,000 draws (''burn-in'' period). We run a series of diagnostics to check the properties of the resulting distributions from the generated chains. We find that the simulated chains converge to stationary distributions and that simulated parameter values are consistent with good identification of parameters. More details are available in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) .
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